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Abstract This paper makes an independent start with formalizing the rules for the
argumentation stage of critical discussions (van Eemeren and Grootendorst A sys-
tematic theory of argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2004, Ch. 6). It does not deal with the well-known
code of conduct consisting of ten rules (the ‘‘ten commandments’’) but with the
system consisting of fifteen (or seventeen) rules on which the code of conduct is
based. The rules of this system are scrutinized and problems they raise are dis-
cussed. Then a formal dialectical system is defined that reflects most of the contents
of these rules. The aim is to elucidate the way the rules work and to show how a
formal approach can be useful to achieve this. It is also shown how the present
method can be used to study the nature of circular argumentation. While, generally,
the formalization follows closely the original rules for the argumentation stage of
critical discussions, there will also be proposed some modifications of the original
protocol.
Keywords Argumentation stage  Conclusive attacks/defenses  Critical
discussion  Formalization  Pragma-dialectics  Successful defenses
1 Introduction
Arend Heyting, the mathematician who formalized Brouwer’s intuitionistic logic,
once had a conversation with his student and colleague the philosopher and logician
Else Barth, who is well known for her considerable contributions to the
development of argumentation theory. ‘‘Why don’t you philosophers formalize
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philosophy?’’ Heyting asked.1 Well, why not? It may be a lot of work, but why not
make a start? A similar question might be asked about the views of pragma-
dialectics: Why shouldn’t we try to formalize those? Again, that will be quite some
job. Yet, in this paper I want to make a start.2
Pragma-dialectics comprises views on philosophical, theoretical, analytical,
empirical, and practical matters (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, Chapter 2).
Not all that is said in these branches lends itself to formalization. The part of
pragma-dialectics I would like to formalize is its theoretical model for conducting a
critical discussion. Perhaps that is the only part of pragma-dialectics that offers
suitable material for formalization. But moreover, I want to focus on rules of
procedure, in particular those rules that concern the argumentation stage of the
discussion, namely rules 6 through 13 (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004,
pp. 144–154), which are cited in the appendix. As I mention these numbers, it may
occur to you that I cannot be referring to the well-known system of ten pragma-
dialectical rules, also known as the ‘‘ten commandments’’ (van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 1992, 2004), which together constitute a code of conduct. Indeed, I am
referring to the also well-known (but perhaps not equally well-known) system of
seventeen (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984) or fifteen (van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 2004) rules. This latter system provides theoretical underpinnings for
the former. The formalization departs from the latest published version, the one with
fifteen rules (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004), to which I shall refer as ‘‘the
original version’’ (namely, the version to be formalized, not the historically first
version).
What do I mean by ‘‘formalizing’’ those rules? Just that I want to define a formal
dialectical system for the argumentation stage of critical discussion that concurs
with the intentions reflected in those rules. That system is to be formal in various
respects (cf. van Eemeren et al. 2014, p. 303): (1) meticulously formal in a
‘‘regulative sense’’: it must be unambiguously determined how discussions begin
and how they end, which roles there are, which moves can legitimately follow upon
a certain kind of move, and what the consequences of each move are, in such a way
that it becomes a completely mechanical affair to check whether a dialogue
instances correct performance or not (the system of fifteen rules is itself formal in a
regulative sense, but not to such an extent that such mechanical decisions are
possible); (2) formal in a ‘‘linguistic sense’’: the language used in the discussion
must be a formal language, as in logical systems (this does not imply that the rules
defining the formal system must themselves be formal in this sense); (3) formal in
an ‘‘a priori sense’’: The formal system’s definition is, just as the system of fifteen
rules, to be a stipulative construction and not a stylized rendering of observed
1 According to what I remember to have heard from Else Barth.
2 This is not to claim that this has been the first, or even the only, start. About the time I first took up the
subject (2011) and later, there were also other attempts to formalize parts or aspects of the pragma-
dialectical model of critical discussion (Visser et al. 2011; Visser 2013, 2015a, b; Secades 2015). The
present work is, in its objectives as well as in its formalization technique, closely related to, though
independent of, Visser’s (2015a, b) approach but offers different solutions for various problems; it is
somewhat further removed from the other approaches.
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behavior in actual discussions. Thus the dialectical system I aspire to construct is
formal in the same ways that systems of formal logic are formal.
What do I hope to achieve by formulating such a formal dialectical system? The
primary aim is to gain insight into the way the original rules for critical discussion
function at the argumentation stage. Specifying the details of a formalization forces
the researcher to scrutinize the procedures such as they are prescribed in the original
informal rules. It may then appear that these informal rules are still at certain points
ambiguous or unclear. It may also be discovered that rules that separately appear to
be completely reasonable lead together to incongruities. The attempt at formaliza-
tion here presented will therefore occasion proposals for modifying the original
protocol.
Before presenting, in Sect. 3, a definition of a formalized system for the
argumentation stage of critical discussion, I shall first discuss a number of problems
I met on the way leading to that result (Sect. 2). After having defined a formal
dialectical system, I show how formalization can be applied in the study of circular
argumentation (Sect. 4) and add some concluding observations (Sect. 5).
2 Problems and Considerations
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 143) start their discussion of the rules for
the argumentation stage of critical discussion with a list of speech acts that may
legitimately be performed at this stage. Rule 6 determines the rights to attack (or
challenge) and to defend of the two parties (the Antagonist and the Protagonist).
Rules 7, 8, and 9 define when an attack or a defense counts as successful and when a
standpoint has been conclusively attacked or defended. These concepts are crucial
for determining—at the concluding stage—the result of the argumentation stage but
they are also used in the description of the argumentation stage itself. Rules 10 and
11 stipulate that rights to attack and to defend are in principle retained throughout
the entire discussion. Rule 12 grants the Protagonist a right to retract arguments he
has put forward. Rule 13 prescribes an orderly conduct of the discussion by
outlawing repetitions and letting the parties move alternately.
2.1 The Speech Acts and Discussion Moves of the Argumentation Stage
At first, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 143) restrict the types of speech
act of the argumentation stage of critical discussion to assertives, commissives, and
directives. More specifically they admit the following kinds of speech act: (1)
argumentation (a complex speech act in defense of a standpoint); (2) acceptance (a
commissive that is not a part of an attack or a defense); (3) negation of acceptance
(a commissive that is part of an attack); (4) request (a directive that also seems to be
part of an attack).3
This list of speech acts will underlie the choice of locution rules for the
formalization. However, the speech act of acceptance can be omitted from the
3 Here I omit the (requests for) usage declaratives, which may occur at any stage of a critical discussion.
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formalization because we shall assume that any unattacked part of an argument
counts as having been accepted for the time being. As moves in the formalized
system we want to construct we then just have: (1) attacks or challenges (which may
be analyzed as being composed of two speech acts: negation of acceptance and
request, namely a request to provide a defense) and (2) defenses such as providing
argumentation.
The only defense move mentioned thus far is the complex speech act
argumentation. But it appears that, according to the original version, the Protagonist
may avail himself also of other means of defense, namely the joint execution of
certain tests. By the intersubjective identification procedure (IIP) discussants check
whether a proposition can be identified with one of those that were—at the opening
stage—accepted by both (pp. 145–147)4; by other tests,5 which we here for
convenience merge into one test to be called the intersubjective linking procedure
(ILP), they check whether an argument has sufficient force of justification (pp.
148–150).6 The Protagonist may appeal to these tests in order to defend an attacked
premise (IIP) or an attacked link between premises and standpoint in an argument
(ILP). It seems reasonable to count the appeal to a test at the argumentation stage as
another kind of defense move, besides argumentation.7 On the level of speech acts
such a move would, so I suggest, consist of a directive: demanding, namely
demanding that a certain test will be executed (refusals are not permitted). This way
to defend would then have to be included in Rule 6a (p. 144) of the original version.
In the formalization we use corresponding locutions (‘‘Test’’).
2.2 The Focus of an Attack
What can be the focus of an attack (or challenge) by the Antagonist? According to
Rule 6b (p. 144), an attack must either focus on the propositional content of an
argument that has been presented in defense of a standpoint (i.e. on the propositional
content of its premises) or on its force of justification. A direct attack on the initial
standpoint is not included. It is left out because it is supposed to have already
occurred at the opening stage. For there we find a ‘‘challenge’’ in response to the
standpoint that was put forward at the confrontation stage (see p. 68, pp. 137ff, and
Rule 4, p. 142). When constructing a simple formalized version of the argumen-
tation stage, one may indeed let the discussion start with a given standpoint and a
given first attack on the standpoint (In Table 1, below, the first two moves would
then be replaced by a text citing the fact that there is a standpoint B that has been
4 Van Eemeren and Grootendorst first describe this procedure as checking whether a proposition occurs
on a list of agreed proposition but later allow also for testing the acceptability of a proposition by various
methods, provided the latter are agreed on by both parties (2004, pp. 145–147).
5 The intersubjective inference procedure, the intersubjective explicitization procedure, and the
intersubjective testing procedure.
6 In the case of a negative standpoint, one has to check the force of refutation instead of the force of
justification. However, I shall not deal with negative standpoints.
7 Such a defense move is, in the original system, excluded by Rule 6 (see esp. Rule 6c) but van Eemeren
and Grootendorst also seem to see an appeal to a test as a method of defense where they speak of ‘‘This
method of defense by the protagonist…’’ (2004, p. 146).
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challenged). However, with a view to the future formalization of more complex
variants of critical discussion (incorporating debate on a plurality of formulations of
the standpoint and admitting different kinds of attack on a standpoint) it is more
practical to construct a formalized argumentation stage that includes (or repeats) the
move in which the Protagonist puts forward his standpoint as well as the move in
which the Antagonist attacks it (as seen in Table 1). In that way, new possibilities
for the argumentation stage (such as debates on ambiguity) can easily be formalized
by constructing an extension of the simple formalization we now seek to achieve.
Another point of difference between the formalized version of critical discussion
and the original version is that the formalized version will for convenience admit as
a borderline case the defense of the initial standpoint by an appeal to the IIP. Thus
we get rid of what otherwise would have been an exception to the rule that, for each
proposition brought forward by the Protagonist and attacked by the Antagonist, the
former may have recourse to the IIP. When such an appeal is successful, the
discussion will of course soon be over. In fact, we then have an argumentation stage
without argumentation.
A more important difference lies in the distinction between different kinds of
attack on the propositional content of an argument that will figure in the formalized
version, but has no place in the original version. In the original version the focus of
such attacks is the propositional content as a whole. But suppose this content consist
of a number of premises (propositions) and that some of these may be defended by
an appeal to the IIP, but others only by means of argumentation. If the Antagonist
attacks the propositional content as a whole, what should the Protagonist do? He
will have to choose for further argumentation to stand a chance of winning. His
additional argument must then, in order to succeed, defend the whole of the
propositional content of the earlier argument, i.e. the conjunction of all premises of
the latter, including those that might more easily have been defended by an appeal
to the IIP. Otherwise the force of justification of the added argument would fall
short.
Suppose, for instance, that the standpoint (1) ‘‘We are our brains’’ is defended by
means of an argument with the following premises: (1.1a) ‘‘Professor S claims that we
are our brains’’; (1.1b) ‘‘Professor S is an expert in the field of neurobiology’’; (1.1c)
‘‘The statement that we are our brains belongs to the field of neurobiology.’’ Suppose
that the Antagonist doubts only (1.1b) but attacks the (whole of the) propositional
content of this argument and that the Protagonist can easily defend (1.1a) and (1.1c)
with an appeal to the IIP, but can defend (1.1b) only by means of further
argumentation, namely: (1.1b.1) ‘‘Professor S has published more than 400 papers in
SCI journals within the field of neurobiology.’’ Since (1.1b.1) falls short as a defense of
(1.1a) and (1.1c), while these are part and parcel of the propositional content that was
attacked, the Protagonist must include these latter propositions as premises in his
additional argument. This argument will therefore have the premises (1.1a), (1.1c) and
(1.1b.1) in order to be able to defend the conjunction of (1.1a), (1.1b), and (1.1c).
Granted that it is not impossible to regiment the discussion in this way, it would
be disastrous for the role of the Antagonist in critical discussion. The Antagonist has
a directive role, according to which she should prompt the Protagonist to defend just
those propositions that are not immediately acceptable to her (in the example only
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(1.1b)). This role would now get a very narrow scope indeed. Therefore a choice has
been made to stipulate in the formalized version that attacks of the Antagonist that
concern the propositional content of an argument will always focus on some
particular premise of that argument.
2.3 Successful and Conclusive Attacks and Defenses
About the notions ‘‘successful defense,’’ ‘‘conclusive defense,’’ ‘‘successful attack,’’
and ‘‘conclusive attack,’’ which are defined in Rules 7, 8 en 9 (van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 2004. pp. 147, 150–151), I wrote before in (Krabbe 2007). There I
argued that these rules taken together do indeed define these notions (by means of a
complex inductive definition) and also proposed some slightly modified definitions,
the gist of which I shall now briefly explain.8
During the course of the discussion, the Protagonist constructs by means of the
separate arguments that he puts forward (which I shall call elementary arguments)
an argument with an ever more complex argumentation structure. An elementary
argument can be rendered as A1,…,An/S, where A1,…,An stand for those
propositions that figure as premises and S stands for the proposition that is being
defended as (sub)standpoint. All these propositions are elements of the argument
that is being constructed. The link between A1,…,An and S (the force of justification
of the argument) counts also as an element (the linking element). Hence the
elements are precisely those objects that can be the focus of an attack by the
Antagonist. An element that has been tested (by the IIP or the ILP) with a (for the
Protagonist) positive result, I shall call fixed. A simple inductive definition9 of the
predicate successfully defended (as applied to elements of the argumentation
structure constructed in the discussion up to a certain moment), can now be
formulated as follows:
(a) (Basic clause) Each fixed element counts as successfully defended.
(b) (Inductive clause) Each element that has been defended by means of an
argument in which it holds for each premise as well as for the link that it
either (i) has not been attacked at all (whereas the Antagonist has had
sufficient opportunity to do so) or (ii) has been successfully defended, counts
as successfully defended.
(c) (Extremal clause) No element counts as successfully defended, unless on the
basis of clauses a) and b) (paraphrasing Krabbe 2007, p. 7).
An initial standpoint or sub-standpoint of which the propositional content is an
element that has been successfully defended counts as conclusively defended.
The question that remains to be settled is: What does ‘‘having had sufficient
opportunity to attack an element’’ exactly mean? The answer depends on the totality
8 The original rules (without modifications) are found in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
9 For the notion of an ‘‘inductive definition,’’ see Kleene (1967 p. 20). It is not unusual to call such
definitions ‘‘recursive,’’ but I would prefer to reserve that term for similarly structured definitions that
define a function over an inductively defined set of objects, such as the natural numbers (Kleene 1967.
pp. 217, 258ff.).
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of rules of discussion because only taken together do the rules of discussion
determine the possible courses of a discussion and thus which opportunities there
were for putting forward a certain move. In any case, it will not always suffice that
there has been a moment at which the Antagonist could have attacked the element,
because at such a moment there might be other moves available for the Antagonist
that are equally urgent, or even more urgent. Since at the end of the argumentation
stage it must be clear whether or not the initial standpoint has been conclusively
defended, one should take care, when formalizing critical discussion, that it will
always be clear whether or not the Antagonist has had sufficient opportunity to
attack elements.
2.4 Retaining One’s Rights to Attack or to Defend
Rules 10 and 11 allow discussants, under conditions, to perform at a later point in
the discussion certain moves that they earlier left undone (van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 2004, pp. 151–152). In these rules, use is made of the notion of a
‘‘successful defense’’ discussed above. This notion is therefore seen to be of
importance, not only for the concluding stage, but also for the argumentation stage.
Of course the Antagonist must be enabled to attack both the propositional content
and the force of justification of each argument. In the formalized version, this is
mirrored by enabling her to attack (challenge) each element. Also the Protagonist
must be enabled to defend himself against each attack (and, in the case of an attack
on a proposition, to appeal to the IIP as well as to defend by means of
argumentation). This aim can indeed be reached by means of such rules as Rule 10
and Rule 11, but also by allowing each participant to consecutively make a number
of moves, in other words, by letting turns of participants consist of a series of
moves. This is the way chosen for the formalized version.
2.5 Retraction
Rule 12 allows the Protagonist to retract arguments (van Eemeren and Grootendorst
2004, pp. 152–153). Retraction is not a defense move and allowing such a move to
be performed at the argumentation stage of critical discussion may lead to
complications, in particular if the participants are allowed only one move in each
turn. Suppose the last attack before the retraction was focused on an element that
was no part of the retracted argument. And suppose that the Antagonist, after the
retraction, performs another attack. The result would be that the Protagonist has now
at least two elements to defend.10 If only one move per turn is allowed, the
10 Or three, if the retraction itself also leaves an element undefended. An example would be that the
initial standpoint S is attacked and defended by P, that P is attacked and defended by Q, and that Q is
attacked and defended by R. Next, the Antagonist attacks the link from P to S. Now the Protagonist
retracts R. Suppose The Antagonist now attacks the link from Q to P. Then P has three attacked elements
to defend: Q, the link from Q to P, and the link from P to S.
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Protagonist can only defend one of them in one turn. Consequently, if there are no
further retractions, there will be from now on at the start of each turn of the
Antagonist at least one attacked and undefended element, and after the Antagonist’s
new attack again at least two attacked and undefended elements. If there are, at a
certain point, no more elements for the Antagonist to attack (the Protagonist has
made the last move, after which there happens to be no possible move for the
Antagonist) the discussion will end with an attacked but undefended element. This
would frustrate the Proponent’s right of retaining rights to defend (Rule 11). In the
formalized version this complication will not arise because there a series of moves
is allowed in each turn, so that the Protagonist can catch up with the Antagonist. To
keep this first attempt at formalizing part of critical discussion simple, I shall
however omit moves of retraction.
2.6 Orderly Conduct
As an important part of their ‘‘regulations for the orderly conduct of a critical
discussion’’ van Eemeren and Grootendorst propose Rule 13 (2004, pp. 153–154).
This rule (a) outlaws repetition of a (complex) speech act, if this speech act plays
the same role as before; (b) stipulates that the discussants ‘‘must in turn make a
move of (complex) speech acts with a particular role in the discussion;’’ (c) outlaws
that discussants ‘‘perform more than one move of (complex) speech acts at one
time’’ (2004, p. 154).
For the interpretation of these rules, it matters a lot what is meant by a ‘‘move of
(complex) speech acts.’’ If this phrase refers to a speaker’s turn, a move that may
itself consist of a number of what we shall call elementary moves (such as attacks or
defenses, which may indeed be analyzed in terms of (complex) speech acts) the
formalized version will concur with Rules 13b and 13c. But since ‘‘at one time’’
most likely must be interpreted as ‘‘in one turn,’’ Rule 13c would then be trivial. If
we interpret ‘‘move of (complex) speech acts’’ as ‘‘elementary move,’’ we can see
that above another choice has already been made: in the formalized version,
discussants are allowed to put forward more than one attack or one defense. In this
way, the formalized version guarantees in a simple way that everyone can make an
optimal use of his or her rights.
Instead of the ban on repetitions of speech acts formulated in Rule 13a, but
serving the same purpose, the formalized version will feature a ban on repeating
elementary moves (locutions).
2.7 Survey of Deviations
Before describing the details of the formalization, I here present a survey of the
points where this formalization deviates from the original version, which were
discussed in this section:
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1. The original version starts from speech acts, the formalization from
elementary moves (Sect. 2.1).
2. The formalization does not contain a locution corresponding to the speech act
of acceptance (Sect. 2.1).
3. The formalization recognizes, besides argumentation, also the demand for the
performance of a test as a way of defense for the Protagonist (Sect. 2.1).
4. The formalization incorporates (or repeats) positing the initial standpoint and
challenging the initial standpoint as moves in the argumentation stage
(Sect. 2.2).
5. The formalization permits a defense of the initial standpoint by means of
demanding a test instead of argumentation (Sect. 2.2).
6. Attacks on the propositional content of argumentation as permitted in the
original version are in the formalization replaced by attacks on separate
premises (Sect. 2.2).
7. The definitions of ‘‘successfully defended’’ and ‘‘conclusively defended’’ of
the original version are replaced by simpler definitions for the formalization
(Sect. 2.3).
8. In the original version the players retain their rights of attack and defense
throughout the discussion, whereas in the formalization such rights can only be
used in the first turn after they were obtained (Sect. 2.4).
9. The original version allows only one ‘‘move of (complex) speech acts’’ in a
turn, whereas the formalization has no such restriction with respect to
elementary moves (Sect. 2.4).
10. The formalization does not allow retractions (Sect. 2.5).
11. The ban on repeating speech acts in the original system is replaced by a ban on
repeating elementary moves (Sect. 2.6).
3 The Formalization
In this section, I shall define a formal dialectical system to be called ‘‘CD1’’ (CD for
Critical Discussion), where ‘‘formal’’ is to be understood as explained in the
introduction. This system corresponds to the argumentation stage of the theoretical
model for conducting critical discussion but includes the introduction of the initial
standpoint and the initial challenge directed at this standpoint. There are two roles:
the role of Protagonist (P) and the role of Antagonist (A). The player taking on the
role of P takes the odd turns, the player taking on the role of A the even ones. To
explain the system, I first describe the first five turns of any discussion following its
rules.
At the start of the discussion (turn 1) P puts forward a standpoint, using the
formal expression (or locution) devised for this purpose: ‘‘Standpoint S’’. S will
count as an element of the argument that P is going to construct.
In the next turn (turn 2), A challenges P to defend S, using the formal expression
‘‘Challenge S’’.11
11 Or ‘‘Attack S’’, if one doesn’t mind the martial metaphor.
The Formalization of Critical Discussion 109
123
In his second turn (turn 3), P is then to defend S. He can proceed in two ways: (1)
P may appeal to the intersubjective identification procedure (or test) IIP to see
whether S is or should be a ‘‘shared premise,’’ using the expression ‘‘TestI S’’. The
test will then be performed. Tests are here represented by functions (I for the IIP
and L for the ILP) with values 1 (for passing) and 0 (for failing). If the result is
positive (notation: I(S) = 1), I shall say that S has been fixed and that the defense
has been successful; if the result is negative (I(S) = 0), this way of defending the
standpoint has failed, but the second way is still open.12 (2) P may also defend S by
putting forward an elementary argument with premises P1,…,Pn, using the formal
expression: ‘‘Argument P1,…,Pn/S’’. Each of the premises P1,…,Pn as well as the
link between these premises and S will be an element of the argumentation
constructed by the Protagonist.
In her second turn (turn 4), A may challenge as many of the premises P1,…,Pn as
she likes and also challenge the link between these premises and S. For challenging
premises, the formal expressions are of the form: ‘‘Challenge Pi’’, and for
challenging the link of the form: ‘‘Challenge P1,…,Pn/S’’.
In his third turn (turn 5), P can try to defend himself against these challenges. For
each premise Pi, P can proceed in either or both of the two ways that were also
available for parrying the attack on the initial standpoint S: (1) an appeal to the IIP,
using the expression: ‘‘TestI Pi’’—the test will then be performed and if the result is
positive (notation: I(Pi) = 1)Pi shall count as fixed; if I(Pi) = 0 the premise has failed
the test, but may still be defended in the second way: (2) a defense of Pi as a sub-
standpoint by putting forward another elementary argument: ‘‘Argument R1,…,Rm/
Pi’’. The link, however, can be defended only by appealing to the intersubjective
linking procedure (or test) ILP to see whether the argument has sufficient force of
justification.13 The formal expression to be used in this case is: ‘‘TestL P1,…,Pn/S’’. If
L(P1,…,Pn/S) = 1, the link will be said to have been fixed. If L(P1,…,Pn/S) = 0, the
link has failed the test and counts as rejected (successfully attacked).
The turns that follow repeat this pattern: When it is A’s turn to move she may
challenge any element that was put forward by P in his preceding turn. When it is
P’s turn, he may try to defend in all admissible ways each element that was
challenged by A in her preceding turn. Thus, in the course of the discussion, the
argument structure of the argument by which P defends his initial standpoint will
become more and more complex.14
12 Presumably, in the original version, a test is performed immediately upon demand and its outcome is
announced before the discussion proceeds. (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, pp. 145–147) and the
same may be assumed for CD1. Anyhow, in CD1, the outcomes of tests do not influence the legitimacy of
moves in the ongoing dialogue but only the result of the dialogue (who has won).
13 As we mentioned before, what is here called ILP actually consists of several procedures. Not all of
these need always to be applied to get an outcome.
14 The present ruling is somewhat simpler than a similar one in (Krabbe 2007), because the latter ruling
allows discussants to react to actions of the interlocutor that occurred not in but before the directly
preceding turn.
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If A in her move forgoes to challenge a certain element she might have
challenged and has closed her turn formally, using the expression ‘‘YourTurn’’, I
shall say that A has had sufficient opportunity to challenge it. In this way, the
question about the gap in the definition of a successfully defended element
(Sect. 2.3) has now been settled.
Below I shall write up the rules of CD1 in the style of defining a Hamblin-type
system of formal dialectic (Hamblin 1970, Ch. 8).15 So let it be supposed that some
underlying formal language has been chosen (italicized capitals refer to sentences of
that language), and that the test functions I (for testing propositional elements by the




Locution types for P: Standpoint S; TestI P; TestL P1,…,Pn/C;
Argument P1,…,Pn/C; YourTurn
Locution types for A: Challenge P; Challenge P1,…,Pn/C; YourTurn
STRUCTURAL RULES
S0 There are two players: P and O.
S1 a. A discussion consists of turns. Each turn has one player as its speaker.
Consecutive turns have different speakers.
b. Each player may contribute one or more locutions in each of his or her turns,
the last locution being ‘‘YourTurn’’ (‘‘YourTurn’’ ends the turn).
c. No locution may be repeated within the same turn.
d. Except ‘‘YourTurn’’, no locution may repeat a locution that was used in an
earlier turn.
S2 P moves first, putting forward ‘‘Standpoint S; YourTurn’’. S is called the initial
standpoint of the discussion. The locution type ‘‘Standpoint T’’ does not occur
elsewhere in the discussion.16
S3 A moves second, putting forward ‘‘Challenge S; YourTurn’’, where S is the
initial standpoint.
15 For a brief description of a prototypical Hamblin system (‘‘System H’’), see also van Eemeren et al.
(2014), Sect. 6.6 Hamblin’s Formal Dialectic.
16 That is to say: not merely may ‘‘Standpoint S’’ not be repeated, but also no other standpoints may be
introduced in the discussion by using this type of locution.
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S4 In his other turns P may (unless he would repeat himself), for each
propositional formula P such that the preceding turn contained ‘‘Challenge P’’,
put forward a locution ‘‘TestI P’’
17 and also one or more locutions ‘‘Argument
R1,…,Rn/P’’18; further P may, if the preceding turn contained a locution
‘‘Challenge P1,…,Pn/C’’, put forward a locution ‘‘TestL P1,…,Pn/C’’. The only
other locution available for P is ‘‘YourTurn’’.
S5 In her other turns A may, if the preceding turn contained ‘‘Argument P1,…,Pn/
C’’, put forward the locution ‘‘Challenge P1,…,Pn/C’’, and also (unless she
would repeat herself), for each propositional formula Pi (1 B i B n), the
locution ‘‘Challenge Pi’’. The only other locution available for A is
‘‘YourTurn’’.
RULES OF WINNING AND LOSING
W1 The game ends as soon as either discussant passes, i.e. utters in his or her turn
merely the locution ‘‘YourTurn’’.
W2 P wins (A loses) if at the end of the game the initial standpoint has been
conclusively defended, otherwise A wins (P loses).19
In the dialogue of Table 1, we see how some of these rules operate. To transform
it into a natural language example one may use the following key list:
KEY LIST
B: We are our brains.
J: Whoever has published more than 400 papers in SCI journals within a field is
an expert in that field.
F: The statement that we are our brains belongs to the field of neurobiology.
P: Professor S has published more than 400 papers in SCI journals within the field
of neurobiology.
C: Professor S claims that we are our brains.
E: Professor S is an expert in the field of neurobiology.
17 As announced, it is not excluded that P uses this locution type as his second turn (P being the initial
standpoint) where P, according to the original version, actually should present an argument rather than
demand a test (cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, Rule 6c, p. 144).
18 To prevent turns from running on indefinitely, further ruling could be installed putting a limit on the
number of different arguments that may be introduced to support one and the same standpoint.
19 In that case A has successfully and conclusively attacked the initial standpoint in the following sense:
(1) the initial standpoint failed the identification test (if applied) and (2) any elementary argument that
P put forward in defense of it contains some challenged element (premise or link) that was not
successfully defended. That a challenged element was not successfully defended means that it failed any
test that was applied to it and was not successfully defended by argument either. See Krabbe 2007. The
winning and losing here refers at first only to the argumentation stage, the concluding stage has still to
follow.
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In the example of Table 1 A wins (and P loses), because I(F) = 0. To check this,
one has to apply the definition of ‘‘successfully defended’’ (Sect. 2.3) to see which
elements are, at the completion of the discussion, successfully defended and whether
the initial standpoint (B) is among them (and, therefore, conclusively defended). First
consider F. F has been tested, but failed the test, so that F is not fixed (i.e. the basic
clause does not apply). Nor has F been defended by argument (the inductive clause
does not apply); thereforeF is, at the end of the discussion, not a successfully defended
element. Now, consider the initial standpoint: B has not been tested, and is therefore
not fixed (the basic clause does not apply). B has been defended by just one argument
(C, E, F/B) but one of the premises of this argument (F) was attacked but has not been
successfully defended (the inductive clause does not apply). Therefore B has, at the
end of the discussion, not been successfully defended either and counts as not
conclusively defended (but as conclusively attacked).
One may notice that A’s challenge of P in turn 6 was superfluous for this result,
but that does not mean that this move is illegitimate according to the rules of CD1.
Table 2 A circular dialogue in CD1
Speaker’s turns Results of tests
1 P: Standpoint S; YourTurn
2 A: Challenge S; YourTurn
3 P: TestI S; Argument T/S; YourTurn I(S) = 0
4 A: Challenge T; Challenge T/S; YourTurn
5 P: TestI T; TestL T/S; Argument S/T; YourTurn I(T) = 0
L(T/S) = 1
6 A: Challenge S/T; YourTurn
7 P: TestL S/T; YourTurn L(S/T) = 1
8 A: YourTurn
Table 1 A dialogue in CD1
Speaker’s turns Results of tests
1 P: Standpoint B; YourTurn
2 A: Challenge B; YourTurn
3 P: Argument C, E, F/B; YourTurn
4 A: Challenge C; Challenge E;
Challenge F; Challenge C, E, F/B; YourTurn
5 P: TestL C, E, F/B; TestI C; Argument J, P/E; TestI F; YourTurn I(C) = 1 I(F) = 0
L(C, E, F/B) = 1
6 A: Challenge P; YourTurn
7 P: TestI P; YourTurn I(P) = 1
8 A: YourTurn
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Whereas the initial standpoint is not conclusively defended in this discussion,
sub-standpoint E is. Notice that in the argument J, P/E the premise P is fixed and
therefore successfully defended by the basic clause. Premise J and the link of this
argument were not attacked, whereas in the end A has had sufficient opportunity to
do so (in turn 6), as in fact A always has in CD1. Therefore E counts as sufficiently
and conclusively defended at the end of the discussion.
4 Application to Circular Argumentation
Notice that neither the original version nor the system CD1 excludes circular
argumentation Consider, for instance, the CD1-dialogue in Table 2.
In this CD1-dialoguePdefends S by means ofT andT by means of S. Neither S norT,
however, has in the end been successfully defended in this way. In CD1 a standpoint
cannot be successfully defended by means of just a circular argument because, to say it
briefly, a successful defense must be grounded in fixed or definitively unattacked
elements. It is not excluded, however, that there is a circular argument for S and also a
noncircular argument, and that the latter argument successfully defends S.
Anyhow, circular arguments are not outlawed in CD1. Such an outlawing
stipulation can, however, easily be introduced. In order to do so I first define a
relation of support among propositions.
Let X be a set of elementary arguments. If P1,…,Pn/C [ X we say that Pi, in X,
directly supports C (1 B i B n). The support relation over X may then be defined as
follows:
(a) If Q, in X, directly supports C then Q, in X, supports C.
(b) If P1,…,Pn/C [ X and there is an i (1 B i B n) such that Q, in X, supports Pi
then Q, in X, supports C.
(c) Support in X occurs exclusively on the basis of clauses a) and b).
The ban on circular argumentation can now be formulated as follows:
Let X be the set of arguments that, at a certain point, have been put forward by
the Protagonist. The move ‘‘Argument P1,…,Pn/C’’ is forbidden for the Protagonist
if in the set X´, which is obtained by adding P1,…,Pn/C to X, one of the Pi
(1 B i B n) supports itself.
5 Concluding Observations
In this paper it has been shown that much of the rulings for critical discussion can be
formalized. The constructed formalized version of rules for the argumentation stage
of critical discussion links up closely with the original version but, as we saw in
Sect. 2.7, there are also differences. Some differences, such as the omission of
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retractions or the different stipulations for banning repetitions, concern technical
details or simplifications. I here summarize just the more conspicuous differences:
(1) The original version starts out from speech acts, the formalized version from
elementary moves (locutions). Speech acts form a deeper layer from which
the meaning of elementary moves can be understood, but they are themselves
not comprised in the formalization (Sect. 2.1).
(2) In the original version the Protagonist can (officially) defend himself only by
means of argumentation (Rule 6c), whereas in the formalized version he can
also do so by demanding that a certain test will be performed (Sect. 2.1).
(3) If in the original version the Antagonist attacks the propositional content of an
argument, she attacks this content as a whole, whereas in the formalized
version an attack at the propositional content must always be directed at a
specific premise (Sect. 2.2).
(4) The original version must probably be understood to admit no more than one
elementary move in each turn, whereas the formalized version admits a series
of elementary moves in each turn (Sect. 2.6).
Yet, with the formal version, I have tried to remain in all respects true to the basic ideas
behind the original version. I would even say that the similarity between the two
versions is close enough to regard a formal dialectical system such as CD1 not only as a
specimen of formal dialectic, but also as an ingredient of the theoretical component of
pragma-dialectics. Consequently, formal dialectic and pragma-dialectics, though
distinct in many respects, may be said to overlap in that there are certain formal
constructions that they are both dealing with.
Obviously, the present formalization (CD1) does not represent the only possible
way to formalize the argumentation stage of critical discussion. Many variations of
the original rules may be developed and their consequences can be elaborated and
investigated in formalized versions. The formal approach in Sect. 4 to deal with
circular argument may serve as an example. Rules can be made more permissive (as
in a variant admitting retractions), but also more rigorous (as in a variant that
restricts the Protagonist to only one argument in direct defense of one and the same
(sub)standpoint). Also one could, for instance, distinguish between two kinds of
attack on the justificatory or refutatory force of an argumentation: one directed at
the sufficiency of the argumentation and one directed at its relevance, each kind
having its own set of possible defense moves that the Protagonist might use (Snoeck
Henkemans 2003, pp. 408–409).20
One could perhaps develop formal systems that stay closer to the original version
than was done in this paper: for instance by maintaining the original restriction of
the content of turns to only one elementary move for each turn, or by relaxing the
present formal rules in such a way that discussants are allowed to react to other
moves than just those that were put forward in the preceding turn.
20 In either case there is different ‘‘strategic advice’’ communicated to the Protagonist (Krabbe and van
Laar 2011).
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In general, by studying formalized versions one can gain insights about
advantages and disadvantages that variants and refinements of the original version
may have for the use of the latter as an (informal) normative model of
argumentative discussion. Such insights easily escape notice if one restricts oneself
to informal considerations.
I hope that the observations in this paper have shown that pragma-dialectical
theory can in various ways profit from investigations that use formalization and that
they will stimulate further research in the directions sketched above.
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Appendix: Rules for the Argumentation Stage of Critical Discussion
Quoted From van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004), Chapter 6
Rule 6
a. The protagonist may always defend the standpoint that he adopts in the initial
difference of opinion or in a sub-difference of opinion by performing a complex
speech act of argumentation, which then counts as a provisional defense of this
standpoint.
b. The antagonist may always attack a standpoint by calling into question the
propositional content or the justificatory or refutatory force of the
argumentation.
c. The protagonist and the antagonist may not defend or attack standpoints in any
other way. (p. 144)
Rule 7
a. The protagonist has successfully defended the propositional content of a
complex speech act of argumentation against an attack by the antagonist if the
application of the intersubjective identification procedure yields a positive
result or if the propositional content is in second instance accepted by both
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parties as a result of a sub-discussion in which the protagonist has successfully
defended a positive sub-standpoint with regard to this propositional content.
b. The antagonist has successfully attacked the propositional content of the
complex speech act of argumentation if the application of the intersubjective
identification procedure yields a negative result and the protagonist has not
successfully defended a positive sub-standpoint with regard to this propositional
content in a sub-discussion. (pp. 147–148)
Rule 8
a. The protagonist has successfully defended a complex speech act of argumen-
tation against an attack by the antagonist with regard to its force of justification
or refutation if the application of the intersubjective inference procedure or
(after application of the intersubjective explicitization procedure) the applica-
tion of the intersubjective testing procedure yields a positive result.
b. The antagonist has successfully attacked the force of justification or refutation
of the argumentation if the application of the intersubjective inference
procedure or (after application of the intersubjective explicitization procedure)
the application of the intersubjective testing procedure yields a negative result.
(p. 150)
Rule 9
a. The protagonist has conclusively defended an initial standpoint or sub-
standpoint by means of a complex speech act of argumentation if he has
successfully defended both the propositional content called into question by the
antagonist and its force of justification or refutation called into question by the
antagonist.
b. The antagonist has conclusively attacked the standpoint of the protagonist if he
has successfully attacked either the propositional content or the force of
justification or refutation of the complex speech act of argumentation. (p. 151)
Rule 10
The antagonist retains throughout the entire discussion the right to call into question
both the propositional content and the force of justification or refutation of every
complex speech act of argumentation of the protagonist that the latter has not yet
successfully defended. (p. 152)
Rule 11
The protagonist retains throughout the entire discussion the right to defend both the
propositional content and the force of justification or refutation of every complex
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speech act of argumentation that he has performed and not yet successfully
defended against every attack by the antagonist. (p. 152)
Rule 12
The protagonist retains throughout the entire discussion the right to retract any
complex speech act of argumentation that he has performed, and thereby to remove
the obligation to defend it. (p. 153)
Rule 13
a. The protagonist and the antagonist may perform the same speech act or the
same complex speech act with the same role in the discussion only once.
b. The protagonist and the antagonist must in turn make a move of (complex)
speech acts with a particular role in the discussion.
c. The protagonist and the antagonist may not perform more than one move of
(complex) speech acts at one time. (p. 154)
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